Is God a man or a woman? When put this way, the question seems absurd. It is silly to think of God as a man or a woman, since such concepts are limited, and God is not. Yet, isn’t that what we do all the time? Don’t we tend to think of “Him” in that way? Isn’t He, after all, the old man in the cloud, reaching out His finger to touch Michelangelo’s Adam to give him life? Isn’t He the angry God of justice and holiness who destroyed the Earth in a flood, sparing only Noah and his family? Isn’t He the God who sent his angels to destroy the cities of Sodom and Gomorrah? Isn’t He the God who chastised the Israelites by sending them into bondage more than once because of their loss of faith and attention? And isn’t He the God who Jesus called “Father” – a male term?
On the other hand, isn’t “He” the God who, out of love and compassion, sent his son, Jesus, to redeem a sinful world? For Trinitarians, isn’t He the God who showed so much compassion and grace that He went willingly to the cross on that mission of redemption? And isn’t He the God who desires to have an intimate, familiar relationship with us where we are nurtured, learn and grow? Isn’t He the wise teacher who patiently leads us down paths beside still waters? Isn’t He the God who welcomes the lamb back into the fold when it strays?
It has been suggested by theologians that God is neither male nor female, nor masculine or feminine – as God transcends these categories. After all, God is infinite and incomprehensible, so how could any category like “male” or “masculine” do justice to such as Him? If male only includes half of any species, how could God be adequately described by such a term? God is whole, complete and undivided – even as we experience Him in three persons. Jesus, when asked by a scribe which commandment is the greatest, replies “Hear, O Israel: the Lord our God, the Lord is one” (NSRV Mark, 12:21)
In the first creation story of the book of Genesis, God says, “Let us make humankind in our image, according to our likeness…So God created humankind in his image, in the image of God he created them; male and female he created them” (1:26-27). Notice that God refers to Himself in first person, plural. One way to understand this would be as a foreshadowing of the Trinity, but another would be a parallel to the male and female that He had created. He created “them; male and female,” “in his image,” “according to our likeness.” This could provide the basis for a different reading than normal, where God Himself is male and female, as is humankind, fashioned in His image.
The second creation story differs from the first. In this account, “the Lord God formed man from the dust of the ground, and breathed into his nostrils the breath of life; and the man became a living being” (2:7). Later, God said, “it is not good that the man should be alone; I will make him a helper as his partner” (2:18). God then created the other animals, but this companionship was not enough, so He “caused a deep sleep to fall upon the man, and he slept; then he took one of his ribs and closed up its place with flesh. And the rib that the Lord God had taken from the man he made into a woman and brought her to the man. Then the man said, ‘This at last is bone of my bones and flesh of my flesh; this one shall be called woman, for out of Man this one was taken.” Therefore a man leaves his father and his mother and clings to his wife, and they become one flesh” (2: 21-23). As interesting as it is that we have two separate, and different, creation stories within the first few pages of the first book of the Bible, it is the nature of God that it highlights that I find most illuminating for our present subject. While this selection is often cited to show the inferior position of the woman (a helper, created after and from Adam), I think a different (and better) reading shows just the opposite. God made Adam in His own image, and the woman later created from his rib was an integral part of that image. To become one flesh, man leaves his home, and then clings to his wife – his “partner.” Man, alone, is partial, just as woman, alone, is partial. God, on the other hand, is integral, from whose image is man and woman, masculine and feminine together. (This does not, by the way, speak to the question of gay or lesbian relationships; but more on that in another column.) Thus, God is neither man nor woman, masculine nor feminine, but the whole from which both were derived.
On this reading, God is sovereign, pure, abstract, distant, just and powerful. At the same time, He(She) is diverse, real, close, compassionate and caring. We should be careful not to talk about God as if He(She) were confined to only one gender. (Norvene Vest uses the spelling Godde instead of God to refer to that complexity.) To do so would be idolatry – the confining of God within a bounded image – regardless of the fact that the image is mental rather than one made of stone, brass or gold. God is He, and God is She – and more. God is Masculine, and God is Feminine – and more. Neither aspect is over the other, but instead, both are parts of God’s image and nature. In the English language, we suffer from the lack of an ungendered personal pronoun. That’s too bad, because God is not (just) a He, nor (just) a She. And, because God is a person (as in the Trinity of the union of three Persons), God is not an It. God transcends these categories. As we talk of (and to) God, let us strive to keep this in mind
Monday, March 27, 2006
Monday, June 27, 2005
Government Support of Gay Pride
According to the New York Times, the Hillsborough County (Florida) Commission "approved by a vote of 5-1, with one abstention, a policy that directs the county government to 'abstain from ackowledging, promoting or participating' in gay pride recognition or events" (6-26-05, p. 1.17). Further, "the commission also voted to require a supermajority vote of 5 to 2 to overturn the policy" (p. 1.17).
I think it is unfortunate that the commission decided to make such a blanket policy. First, it singles out a group of legitimate citizens and says, in effect, that government shall not take heed of them. Will a public administrator be in violation of this policy if he or she allows gay groups, as gay groups, to participate in public hearings or other forms of participatory democracy? After all, doing so would be an acknowledgement or recognition of gay citizens - a source of pride.
Second, it deals with the issue with a one-size-fits-all brush. Rather than deal with the question on a case-by-case basis, the commission is saying that gay pride is itself something that government in Hillsborough county must not associate with.
Third, it begs the question of the First Amendment rights of gay pride groups. Since the county cannot refuse to grant parade permits based on the content of the speech being espoused by the marchers, but can only make content-neutral limitations on their access to the same rights that other groups (like the Daughters of the American Revolution) are granted, it is unclear what the real effect of the new p0licy will be. If the county grants permits for a gay-pride event based on a content-neutral determination, then will they then be in violation of their own policy? If they refuse to grant such a permit, are they then not in violation of the Constitution, as interpreted by the Supreme Court?
Fourth, as a county policy, it is unclear to me what the effect would be on municipalities within the county. Will cities also be required to follow this rule, or can only the state impose such rules on them?
Perhaps the biggest problem, though, is the supermajority requirement, which is inherently anti-democratic in nature. It appears that, if you can control a majority of the commission at any given time, you can vote for supermajority requirements that will make it difficult, if not impossible, for future commissions to make changes or repeal those policies. The only way to truly be able to do this with a shred of democratic spirit would be to make changes to the charter of the county - and that cannot be done, democratically, without a public referendum.
I think it is unfortunate that the commission decided to make such a blanket policy. First, it singles out a group of legitimate citizens and says, in effect, that government shall not take heed of them. Will a public administrator be in violation of this policy if he or she allows gay groups, as gay groups, to participate in public hearings or other forms of participatory democracy? After all, doing so would be an acknowledgement or recognition of gay citizens - a source of pride.
Second, it deals with the issue with a one-size-fits-all brush. Rather than deal with the question on a case-by-case basis, the commission is saying that gay pride is itself something that government in Hillsborough county must not associate with.
Third, it begs the question of the First Amendment rights of gay pride groups. Since the county cannot refuse to grant parade permits based on the content of the speech being espoused by the marchers, but can only make content-neutral limitations on their access to the same rights that other groups (like the Daughters of the American Revolution) are granted, it is unclear what the real effect of the new p0licy will be. If the county grants permits for a gay-pride event based on a content-neutral determination, then will they then be in violation of their own policy? If they refuse to grant such a permit, are they then not in violation of the Constitution, as interpreted by the Supreme Court?
Fourth, as a county policy, it is unclear to me what the effect would be on municipalities within the county. Will cities also be required to follow this rule, or can only the state impose such rules on them?
Perhaps the biggest problem, though, is the supermajority requirement, which is inherently anti-democratic in nature. It appears that, if you can control a majority of the commission at any given time, you can vote for supermajority requirements that will make it difficult, if not impossible, for future commissions to make changes or repeal those policies. The only way to truly be able to do this with a shred of democratic spirit would be to make changes to the charter of the county - and that cannot be done, democratically, without a public referendum.
Wednesday, June 15, 2005
Culture of Life, Culture of Death
I often hear from those persons who describe themselves as supporters of a "culture of life" - that anyone who doesn't support the policies that they associate with that culture is thereby in favor of a "culture of death." Yet, does such a dichotomy make sense? Is there no other option besides these two, that one is either in favor of one or the other? Or, would it be better to say that the question is set up to be misleading and is therefore not a reasonable question in the first place?
I support the latter position. First, there is more to the question than life and death. There is also the question of types or qualities of life (relating to questions of assisted suicide), questions of when human life truly begins to exist in a meaningful way (relating to questions of abortion and stem cell research), and questions of due process (relating to questions of the death penalty. There are also questions of when it is right or even obligatory to kill (as in "just war" theory), and whether it is at all ethical to profit from someone's life or death (think of the insurance and mortuary industries, IVF clinics who create many more embryoes than they are likely to use, and companies that engage in stem cell research with the hope of future profit.
I want to pursue these questions in future postings, but will content myself for the moment by suggesting that it is very difficult to fashion a completely consistent "culture of life" argument that ties all these areas together. The Roman Catholic Church makes a pretty good effort at consistency here, but many members of the so-called religious right do a lousy job of it. They seem to argue that there is a religious basis for going to war even when the reasons for doing so are short of the standard of "imminent danger." They also argue that capital punishment is acceptable to Christianity (or even obligatory in the sense of the state protecting a "godly" people). Yet, in both cases, they are supporting policy of death over one of life, mercy or prudence. To be fair, they would argue that there is a difference between a helpless "unborn child" and a convicted murderer. However, this introduces the idea that there are some extraneous factors to the life-death question that can make death an acceptable alternative.
In the end, all they are really doing is choosing which factors they prefer while denying others the same privilege. By collapsing all of this into a culture of life vs. culture of death dichotomy, they oversimplify the question by denying the existence of such factors while implicitly taking advantage of them.
I'm not sure whether this is a matter of unclear thinking, or of simple (?) hypocrisy.
I support the latter position. First, there is more to the question than life and death. There is also the question of types or qualities of life (relating to questions of assisted suicide), questions of when human life truly begins to exist in a meaningful way (relating to questions of abortion and stem cell research), and questions of due process (relating to questions of the death penalty. There are also questions of when it is right or even obligatory to kill (as in "just war" theory), and whether it is at all ethical to profit from someone's life or death (think of the insurance and mortuary industries, IVF clinics who create many more embryoes than they are likely to use, and companies that engage in stem cell research with the hope of future profit.
I want to pursue these questions in future postings, but will content myself for the moment by suggesting that it is very difficult to fashion a completely consistent "culture of life" argument that ties all these areas together. The Roman Catholic Church makes a pretty good effort at consistency here, but many members of the so-called religious right do a lousy job of it. They seem to argue that there is a religious basis for going to war even when the reasons for doing so are short of the standard of "imminent danger." They also argue that capital punishment is acceptable to Christianity (or even obligatory in the sense of the state protecting a "godly" people). Yet, in both cases, they are supporting policy of death over one of life, mercy or prudence. To be fair, they would argue that there is a difference between a helpless "unborn child" and a convicted murderer. However, this introduces the idea that there are some extraneous factors to the life-death question that can make death an acceptable alternative.
In the end, all they are really doing is choosing which factors they prefer while denying others the same privilege. By collapsing all of this into a culture of life vs. culture of death dichotomy, they oversimplify the question by denying the existence of such factors while implicitly taking advantage of them.
I'm not sure whether this is a matter of unclear thinking, or of simple (?) hypocrisy.
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